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Abstract
Policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs routinely suggest that 
bringing Alan Greenspan back in the 1970s’ United States would not have prevented 
the Great Inflation. We show that a standard policy counterfactual suggests that the 
Bundesbank–which is near-universally credited for sparing West Germany the Great 
Inflation–would also not have been able to prevent the Great Inflation in the United 
States. The sheer implausibility of this result sounds a cautionary note on taking the 
outcome of SVAR-based policy counterfactuals at face value, and raises questions on 
the very reliability of such exercises.
Keywords: Bayesian VARs; time-varying parameters; stochastic volatility; identified 
VARs; Great Inflation; policy counterfactuals. 
JEL Classification: E32, E47, E52, E58 5
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Non Technical Summary
A standard result produced by structural VAR-based studies of the U.S. Great Mod-
eration is that imposing over the entire post-WWII sample the structural monetary
policy rule associated with the more recent, and more stable, period–in the litera-
ture jargon, ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’–would not have prevented the
Great Inﬂation, and, more generally, would only have exerted a limited impact on
U.S. post-WWII macroeconomic dynamics. Because of the comparatively wide range
of VAR speciﬁcations and identiﬁcation schemes conditional on which it has been
produced, the result that ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’ would only have
exerted a limited impact on U.S. post-WWII macroeconomic dynamics is regarded
as a very robust outcome of the structural VAR methodology, and is routinely taken
to imply that sheer ‘luck’ has played a dominant role in shaping U.S. post-WWII
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
The Bundesbank is near-universally credited, within both academia and central
banking, for preventing the Great Inﬂation in West Germany. As a consequence, we
would logically expect that policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs
for the United States and West Germany would suggest that–in the very same way
as the Bundesbank was able to successfully counter the 1970s’ inﬂationary impulses
for West Germany–it would have been able to prevent the Great Inﬂation if it had
been put in charge of U.S. monetary policy.
As this paper shows, this is not the case: imposing the structural monetary policy
rule estimated for West Germany’s Bundesbank in the post-WWII United States (i)
would only have exerted a limited impact on overall macroeconomic dynamics, and
(ii) crucially, it would not have prevented the Great Inﬂation. The results produced by
this counterfactual are therefore qualitatively the same as those obtained by ‘bringing
Alan Greenspan back in time’. The key diﬀerence is that, whereas in the case of
Alan Greenspan (or, more generally, of FED oﬃcials who have been in charge of
U.S. monetary policy over the most recent years) we have no way of knowing how
they would have performed had they been in charge of U.S. monetary policy in the
1970s, this is obviously not the case for the Bundesbank. West Germany’s central
bank was indeed there, and its monetary policy is widely credited for sparing West
Germany the Great Inﬂation. The notion that, if it had been put in charge of post-
WWII U.S. monetary policy, it would have been unable to successfully counter the
1970s’ inﬂationary upsurge in the United States is therefore extremely hard to believe.
As a logical corollary, this result raises serious questions on the very reliability of
policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs, a reliability which, it is
important to stress, has always been assumed, rather than demonstrated.6
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The start of in ation occurred under the Bretton Woods system of xed exchange rates.
[...] Once the xed exchange rate system ended, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria
reduced their in ation rates. Others permitted in ation to continue or increase. [...] The
s t a r to ft h eG r e a tI n  ation–the sustained increase in the price level–was a monetary
event. Monetary policy could have mitigated or prevented the in ation but failed to do so.
–Allan Meltzer1
In the 1970s and 80s there were few central banks whose policy responses to in ation
provided a su!cient tightening of policy in the face of in ation to anchor public beliefs
around low and stable in ation. [...] [A]n exception to the general picture was the Bun-
desbank which kept stable and positive real interest rates over this period with the result
that German in a t i o nr e m a i n e dl o wa n ds t a b l ee v e nt h o u g hi tw a ss u b j e c tt ot h es a m e
international cost shocks as the other countries [...].
–Timothy Besley2
[D]ue to the vigorous action by the Bundesbank, Germany experienced much lower
in ation rates than did the United States. In fact, after its peak in 1981, when the in ation
rate stood at 6.3 percent, the German in ation rate swiftly declined, reaching values of
around 2 percent at the end of 1985 [...].
–Otmar Issing3
1 Introduction
A standard result produced by structural VAR-based studies of the U.S. Great Mod-
eration is that imposing over the entire post-WWII sample the structural monetary
policy rule associated with the more recent, and more stable, period–in the litera-
ture jargon, ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’–would not have prevented the
Great In ation, and, more generally, would only have exerted a limited impact on
U.S. post-WWII macroeconomic dynamics. This result has been obtained based on
either Markov-switching4 or time-varying parameters VARs,5 and based on several
alternative identication schemes–specically, Cholesky, as in Primiceri (2005); sign
restrictions, as in the work of Fabio Canova and his co-authors; and based on the al-
ternative identication scheme of Sims and Zha (2006). Because of the comparatively
wide range of VAR specications and identication schemes conditional on which it
has been produced, the result that ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’ would




4See e.g. Sims and Zha (2006).
5See e.g. Primiceri (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006), and Canova and Gambetti
(2008).7
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regarded as a very robust outcome of the structural VAR methodology, and is rou-
tinely taken to imply that sheer ‘luck’ (that is, shocks), has played a dominant role
in shaping U.S. post-WWII macroeconomic  uctuations.
With a few exceptions,6 such result is typically not questioned.7 The reason for
this is quite obvious, although never explicitly mentioned in the literature: during the
1970s, Alan Greenspan was not Chairman of the FED,8 and as a result there is simply
no way of knowing whether, facing those very same shocks, he would have been able to
spare the U.S. economy the Great In ation.9 There is however at least one important
exception to this logic:10 the Bundesbank is near-universally credited, within both
academia and central banking, for preventing the Great In ation in West Germany.
As a consequence, we would logically expect that policy counterfactuals based on
estimated structural VARs for the United States and West Germany would suggest
that–in the very same way as the Bundesbank was able to successfully counter the
1970s’ in ationary impulses for West Germany–it would have been able to save
the day if it had been put in charge of U.S. monetary policy. Quite stunningly,
as this paper shows, this is not the case: imposing the structural monetary policy
rule estimated for West Germany’s Bundesbank in the post-WWII United States (i)
would only have exerted a limited impact on overall macroeconomic dynamics, and
(ii) crucially, it would not have prevented the Great In ation. The results produced by
this counterfactual are therefore qualitatively the same as those obtained by ‘bringing
Alan Greenspan back in time’. The key dierence is that, whereas–as we previously
discussed–in the case of Alan Greenspan (or, more generally, of FED o!cials who
have been in charge of U.S. monetary policy over the most recent years) we have
no way of knowing how they would have performed had they been in charge of U.S.
monetary policy in the 1970s, this is obviously not the case for the Bundesbank.W e s t
Germany’s central bank was indeed there, and its monetary policy is widely credited
6See in particular DeLong (2003) and Bernanke (2004). In a paper conceptually related to the
present work, Benati and Surico (2009) produce a simple example in the spirit of Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) in which (i) a shift in the systematic component of
monetary policy such as to move the economy from the indeterminacy to the determinacy region is
su!cient, by itself, to replicate the key qualitative features of the transition from the Great In ation
to the Great Moderation; and (ii) structural VAR methods, when applied to this data-generation
process, fail to point towards a change in policy as the cause of the changes in the reduced-form
properties of the economy, and–in line with the results produced by structural VAR-based studies
of the Great Moderation–point instead towards a fall in the volatilities of the structural shocks.
7More generally, doubts about the reliability of SVAR-based policy counterfactuals are seldom
expressed. An exception is represented by Christiano (1998)’s discussion of Sims (1998).
8Indeed, during those years he was either working in the private sector, as a macroeconomic
forecaster, or working for the U.S. Government in a number of jobs (e.g., as Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers) which, however, were all outside of the Federal Reserve System.
9After all, this is precisely the reason why the counterfactual is performed in the rst place ...
10We say ‘at least’ because, as stressed (e.g.) by Meltzer’s initial quotation, West Germany was not
the only country to escape the 1970s largely unscathed: Japan, Austria, and especially Switzerland,
too, were equally successful under this respect. Quite obviously, the very same logic underlying the
present work could equally be applied to those three countries.8
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for sparing West Germany the Great In ation. The notion that, if it had been put in
charge of post-WWII U.S. monetary policy, it would have been unable to successfully
counter the 1970s’ in ationary upsurge in the United States is therefore extremely
hard to believe. As a logical corollary, this result raises serious questions on the very
reliability of policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs, a reliability
which, it is important to stress, has always been assumed, rather than demonstrated.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the reduced-form
specication for the time-varying parameters VAR with stochastic volatility we will
use throughout the paper, and the identication strategy, which is based on sign
restrictions, whereas (standard) technical aspects of the Bayesian inference–in par-
ticular, our choices for the priors, and the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm we
use to simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states con-
ditional on the data–are relegated to an appendix. Section 3 presents results from the
policy counterfactual in which we ‘bring the Bundesbank to the post-WWII United
States’, by imposing over the entire U.S. post-WWII sample period the structural
monetary rule estimated for West Germany’s central bank. Section 4 draws some im-
plications of these results for macroeconomics. In particular, we argue that the sheer
implausibility of the outcome produced by this counterfactual–an outcome which,
it is important to stress, has been obtained based on standard methodology–raises
questions on the very reliability of SVAR-based policy counterfactuals. Section 5
concludes, and outlines directions for future research.
2 Methodology
2.1 A Bayesian time-varying parameters VAR with stochas-
tic volatility
In what follows we work with the following time-varying parameters VAR(p)m o d e l :
\w = E0>w + E1>w\w31 + === + Es>w\w3s + w  [
0
ww + w (1)
where the notation is obvious, and \w (which is an N×1 vector) is dened as either
\w  [uw, w, |w, pw]0,o r\w  [uw, w, |w, pw, qhhuw]0,w i t huw, w, |w, pw,a n dqhhuw being
a short-term interest rate (specically, the Federal Funds rate for the United States,
and a call money rate for West Germany), GDP de ator in ation, and the rates of
change of real GDP, nominal M2, and the nominal eective exchange rate (henceforth,
NEER), respectively (for a description of the data, see Appendix A).11 The overall
sample periods are 1959:2-2008:1 for the United States, and 1960:2-1990:25 for West
11GDP de ator in ation and the rates of growth of real GDP, nominal M2, and the NEER have
been computed as the annualised quarter-on-quarter rates of growth of the relevant series.9
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Germany.12 For reasons of comparability with other papers in the literature13 we set
the lag order to p=2. Following, e.g., Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Primiceri (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) the VAR’s time-
varying parameters, collected in the vector w, are postulated to evolve according
to
s(w | w31, T)=L(w) i(w | w31, T) (2)
with L(w) being an indicator function rejecting unstable draws–thus enforcing a
stationarity constraint on the VAR–and with i(w | w31, T) given by
w = w31 + w (3)
with w  Q(0>T ). The VAR’s reduced-form innovations in (1) are postulated to
be zero-mean normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix lw which,
following established practice, we factor as











k1>w 0 ... 0
0 k2>w ... 0









2>1>w 1 ... 0
... ... ... ...




with the kl>w evolving as geometric random walks,
lnkl>w =l nkl>w31 + l>w (6)
For future reference, we dene kw  [k1>w, k2>w, ... ,kQ>w]0. Following Primiceri (2005),
we postulate the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix Dw–which we collect
in the vector w  [2>1>w, 3>1>w, ..., Q>Q31>w]0–to evolve as driftless random walks,
w = w31 + w ,( 7 )





























1 0 ... 0
0 2
2 ... 0







12The rst 8 years of data are however used to calibrate the Bayesian priors, based on a time-
invariant version of the same VAR used in estimation.
13See e.g. Primiceri (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006), and Canova and Gambetti
(2008).10
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 .14 Finally, following, again, Primiceri (2005) we
adopt the additional simplifying assumption of postulating a block-diagonal structure
for ,t o o – n a m e l y




1 01×2 ... 01×(−1)
02×1 2 ... 02×(−1)
... ... ... ...




with 1 ≡ Var(21), 2 ≡ Var([3132]0),. . . ,a n d−1 ≡ Var([1, 2, ..., −1]0),
thus implying that the non-zero and non-one elements of  belonging to diﬀerent
rows evolve independently. As discussed in Primiceri (2005, Appendix A.2), this as-
sumption drastically simpliﬁes inference, as it allows to do Gibbs sampling on the
non-zero and non-one elements of  equation by equation.
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. Appendix B discusses our choices
for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (speciﬁcally, Gibbs-
sampling) we use to simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and
the states conditional on the data.
2.2 Identiﬁcation
In either VAR we identify N shocks by imposing sign restrictions15 on the estimated
reduced-form VAR on a period-by-period basis. Speciﬁcally, in the smaller VAR we
identify four shocks–a monetary policy shock (
 ), a supply shock (
 ), a demand
non-policy shock (
 ), and a money demand shock (
 )–wheres in the larger one
we identify an additional shock (
 ) which can be given several alternative in-
terpretations. For example, it might reﬂect either a shock to the foreign exchange
risk premium, or the impact of a foreign monetary policy shock. The following ta-
ble summarises the sign restrictions we impose on the estimated VAR. A ‘+’ and
a ‘-’ mean ‘greater than or equal to zero’ and ‘smaller than or equal to zero’, re-
spectively, whereas a ‘?’ means that the sign of this speciﬁci m p a c th a sb e e nl e f t
unconstrained. Sign restrictions are imposed only on impact (that is, at zero). It can
be trivially shown that these sign restrictions are suﬃcient to identify the shocks. We
compute the time-varying structural impact matrix, 0, via the procedure proposed
by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005).16
14As discussed in Primiceri (2005, pp. 6-7), there are two justiﬁcations for assuming a block-
diagonal structure for . First, parsimony, as the model is already quite heavily parameterized.
Second, ‘allowing for a completely generic correlation structure among diﬀerent sources of uncer-
tainty would preclude any structural interpretation of the innovations’.
15Sign restrictions have been used in the studies of the U.S. Great Moderation of Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006) and Canova and Gambetti (2008).
16Speciﬁcally, let Ω = 0
 be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR’s time-
varying covariance matrix Ω,a n dl e t ˜ 0 ≡ 
1
2
 .W ed r a wa n ×  matrix, ,f r o mt h e(0,11
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short rate ++? + —
in ation —+— — —
output growth —+ + — —
money growth —+? + ?
rate of change of NEER +++ + +
We eschew Cholesky, on the other hand–although it has been used in one of the
best-known studies of the U.S. Great Moderation17– b e c a u s e ,a si ti sw e l lk n o w n ,
DSGE models exhibit a recursive ordering of the variables only under very special
circumstances (basically, for a DSGE model to exhibit a recursive structure it has to
be specically ‘engineered’ for that purpose). To put it dierently, within a DSGE
context the ‘normal state of aairs’ is for all structural shocks to have an impact at
zero on all variables, so that the imposition of a Cholesky structure for the impact
matrix at zero can safely be regarded, in general, as being pretty far away from the
truth, whatever the truth in fact is. Further, as shown by Canova and Pina (2005),
the imposition of a recursive ordering of the variables when such ordering is, in fact,
false, can lead to a dramatic distortion of the inference.18 On the other hand, precisely
because, within a DSGE context, the impact at zero of all structural shocks is, in
general, non-zero on all variables, sign restrictions appear as the most natural choice,
since they do not impose ‘incredible’ zero restrictions on impact.
Finally, another possibility–which we however leave to future research–would
be to consider the identication scheme used by Sims and Zha (2006). Although such
scheme is almost entirely based on zero restrictions on impact,19 their use of monthly,
as opposed to quarterly, data, makes the imposition of such restrictions much more
plausible, notwithstanding what we just said about the impacts of all structural
shocks at zero on all variables as being in general non-zero within a DSGE context.
For example, it appears as entirely reasonable to assume that variables capturing real
economic activity–in the case of Sims and Zha (2006), the unemployment rate and
monthly interpolated real GDP–do not react to monetary shocks within the month,
whereas nancial variables instead do.
1) distribution, we take the TU decomposition of N–that is, we compute matrices T and U such
that N=T · U–and we compute the time-varying structural impact matrix as D0>w= ˜ D0>w · T0.I f
the draw satises the restrictions we keep it, otherwise we discard it and we keep drawing until the
restrictions are satised, as in the Rubio-Waggoner-Zha code SRestrictRWZalg.m which implements
their algorithm. (See at http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.)
17See Primiceri (2005).
18Canova and Pina (2005) stochastically simulate standard DSGE models and apply Cholesky to
the articial data. They show that, rst, in general, impulse-response functions are dramatically
mis-estimated; and second, in several instances the use of Cholesky gives rise to an estimated ‘price
puzzle’ which was not in the original data-generation process.
19See their Table I, and the discussion in Section IV.12
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3W o u l d t h e Bundesbank Have Prevented the Great
Inﬂation in the United States?
Figures 1-4 show the results from the counterfactual simulations20 in which we ‘bring
the Bundesbank to the United States’, by imposing the structural monetary pol-
icy rule estimated for West Germany’s central bank for the period 1973:2-1990:1 in
the estimated structural VAR for the U.S. economy over the entire sample period.21
Speciﬁcally, Figures 1 and 2 show results based on the four-variables VAR, whereas
Figures 3 and 4 show those based on the larger VAR, which also includes the rate of
change of the NEER. Figures 1 and 3 show, for all the series used in the VAR, the
actual historical values together with the medians and the 16th and the 84th per-
centiles of the distributions of the simulated counterfactuals series, whereas Figures 2
and 4 show the medians and the 16th and the 84th percentiles of the distributions of
the diﬀerence between the actual and the counterfactual series. Since a comparison
between Figures 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, respectively, shows that results are qualita-
tively the same for the two alternative VAR speciﬁcations, in what follows we will
exclusively focus on those produced by the four-variables VAR.
Focusing in particular on inﬂation, the upper right panel of Figure 2 shows how the
diﬀerence between the actual and the counterfactual inﬂation series during the Great
Inﬂation episode is, overall, quite modest, with median estimates oscillating between
slightly below -2 per cent and slightly above 2 per cent. The overall negligible impact
of putting the Bundesbank in charge of post-WWII U.S. monetary policy–when seen
through the lenses of the SVAR-based counterfactual–is even more apparent from the
upper right panel of Figure 1, in which the median of the counterfactual simulation
closely tracks actual inﬂation most of the times. During the 1970s the Federal Funds
rate would have been, on average, lower than the actual one–this is especially clear
during the second half of the decade–whereas starting from the beginning of the
20For each simulation =1, 2, ..., 1,000, at each quarter =+1, +2, ...,  we draw three random
numbers, , indexing the quarter between 1973:2 and 1990:1 (included) from which we draw the
elements of the Bundesbank’s structural monetary rule; and  and , indexing the iterations of
the Gibbs sampler at times  and, respectively,  from which we draw the state of the economy. (All
three numbers are deﬁned over appropriate uniform distributions.) We then take all of the elements
of the monetary rule from iteration  of the Gibbs sampler for quarter  of the estimated SVAR
for West Germany, while we take everything else from iteration  for quarter  of the estimated
SVAR for the United States. We start each counterfactual simulation conditional on the ﬁrst 
actual historical values of the vector  for the U.S.. Finally, we convert the quarter-on-quarter
rates of growth of the GDP deﬂator, real GDP, M2, and the NEER into annual rates of growth by
simply computing the convolutions of the quarter-on-quarter rates of growth at time t a n di nt h e
previous three quarters. Speciﬁcally, letting x
 and x

 be the annual and quarterly rates of growth










21The reason for focusing on the period following 1973:1 is that in March 1973 West Germany
abandoned the parity with respect to the U.S. dollar, so that the Bundesbank was free to fully
pursue a counter-inﬂationary policy without the impedements coming from such external constraint
(on this, see Issing, 2005, p. 329).13
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following decade (with the exception of the rst half of 1980) becomes smaller. Finally,
for real GDP growth and M2 growth, too, the 1970s are not characterised by any
systematic dierence between actual and counterfactuals series.
4 Implications for Macroeconomics
Given that, within the present work, we are not considering any plausible identica-
tion scheme,22 we obviously cannot claim that failure, on the part of the Bundesbank,
to prevent the Great In a t i o ni nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e si sarobust implication of policy
counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs. So it is entirely possible that,
had we performed the counterfactual based on an alternative identication strategy–
for example, Sims and Zha’s (2006)–we might have obtained the alternative result
that the Bundesbank could have prevented the U.S. Great In ation.
The key point of this paper, however, is not to claim that policy counterfactu-
als based on structural VARs are in general unreliable. Rather, it is to show, by
example, that standard structural VAR methodology can produce results which the
vast majority of macroeconomists would regard as extremely hard to believe. The
notion that the Bundesbank–which burnished its reputation as a hard-nosed, hard-
money central bank by preventing the Great In a t i o ni nW e s tG e r m a n y – w o u l dh a v e
been unable to deliver an analogous performance had it been put in charge of U.S.
monetary policy is indeed one such, highly implausible result.23
So, two things ought to be stressed here. First, the reliability of policy counter-
factuals based on estimated structural VARs has never been demonstrated in any
way, and it has rather always been assumed.A st h i sp a p e rh a ss h o w nb ym e a n so f
a simple example, however, such assumption appears to be, in general, unwarranted,
as such counterfactuals can indeed produce ‘incredible’ results.24 Second,w h e r e a s ,
for a specic methodology to be regarded as reliable, it has to be shown to perform
well conditional on a wide range of plausible circumstances, a single example of an
unsatisfactory performance under relatively ‘normal’ circumstances is su!cient to
raise doubts on its reliability. Under this respect, the counterfactual associated with
‘bringing the Bundesbank to the United States’ ought to be regarded a ‘standard’
one: in particular, the only dierence with the traditional counterfactual of ‘bringing
Alan Greenspan back in time’ is that, instead of being performed within a single
country and across time it is performed across countries. So the fact that this coun-
terfactual produces such an implausible outcome sounds a cautionary note on taking
22By ‘plausible’ we mean schemes which, dierent from Cholesky, can be justied/defended on
conceptual grounds, in particular with reference to standard macroeconomic theory.
23Unfortunately, ‘bringing the Bundesbank to the United States’ is the only ‘test’ of the reliability
of policy counterfactuals based on structural VARs we could come up with.
24As we previously mentioned in footnote 7, Benati and Surico (2009) produce a simple DSGE-
based example in which policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural VAR(MA) repre-
sentation of the model dramatically fail.14
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results from SVAR-based policy counterfactuals at face value, to the point of raising
questions on their very reliability.
5 Conclusions, and Directions for Future Research
Since the structural VAR methodology came to essentially dominate applied macro-
economic research, around mid-1980s, policy counterfactuals have been one of its
main applications. As we have discussed, the outcome of such counterfactuals is sel-
dom questioned, and the results they produce are usually taken at face value. In this
paper we have shown that standard structural VAR methodology, when applied to a
specic policy counterfactual–‘bringing the Bundesbank to the post-WWII United
States’–produces a result which the vast majority of macroeconomists would likely
nd extremely hard to believe: the very same central bank which burnished its ‘hard-
money’, anti-in ation reputation by successfully countering the 1970s’ in ationary
impulses in West Germany would not have been able to deliver a comparable per-
formance had it been put in charge of U.S. monetary policy. The fact that (i)s u c h
counterfactual is a ‘standard’ one–in the specic sense that, instead of being per-
formed within a single country and across time, it is performed across countries–and
(ii) it has been produced based on ‘o-the-shelf’ methods (in terms of both estimation
and identication), sounds a cautionary note on taking the outcome of SVAR-based
policy counterfactuals at face value, and raises questions on their very reliability.
W h e r ec o u l dt h ep r o b l e m sc o m ef r o m ?M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,w h a tm i g h tg ow r o n gw h e n
performing policy counterfactuals based on structural VARs? An issue which is some-
times mentioned–the possible relevance of the Lucas critique for such counterfactuals–
is not, in our view, a relevant one. The reason for this is quite simple: the key theme
of the Lucas critique is the impact of changes in policy on the reduced-form properties
of the economy. To the extent that the structural VAR correctly captures the true
underlying structure of the economy–as dened, for example, by a standard New
Keynesian model–the Lucas critique should therefore not be, as a simple matter of
logic, a problem at all.25 So the fundamental problem, in our view, is rather the very
ability of structural VAR methods to correctly capture the true underlying structure
of the economy, or, to just rephrase the same concept, the mapping between the
underlying true (DSGE) model and the theoretical structural VAR representation
which is implied by that very model. The implicit presumption behind SVAR-based
policy counterfactuals is that switching the estimated coe!cients of the interest rate
equations in the structural VAR provides a reasonable approximation to the authentic
policy counterfactual, i.e. the one the researcher wold obtain if (s)he were to switch
the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. Benati
and Surico (2009), however, produce a simple example in which this presumption is
25T op u ti td i erently, structural VARs have been ‘sold’ as structural, so they can’t possibly suer
from a problem which plagues reduced-form models.15
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dramatically violated, so that changes in the interest rate equation of the structural
VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the parameters of the monetary
policy rule in the underlying DSGE model. So the key issue here, in our view, is the
mapping between the underlying true model of the economy and its structural VAR
representation, and in particular the ability of counterfactuals based on the latter
to correctly capture the true counterfactuals based on the former. Both issues are
currently being investigated in our work in progress.16
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AT h e D a t a
A.1 United States
Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for the GDP de ator (‘GDPCTPI: Gross Do-
mestic Product: Chain-type Price Index, Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly, Index
2000=100’) and real GDP (‘GDPC96: Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal, Sea-
sonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Quarterly, Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars’) are both
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and are both
available since 1947:1. A monthly series for the Federal Funds rate (‘FEDFUNDS:
Eective Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, Percent’) from the Board of Governors of
t h eF e d e r a lR e s e r v eS y s t e mis available since July 1954, and has been converted to
the quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter. A monthly seasonally
adjusted series for M2 (‘M2SL: M2 Money Stock, H.6 Money Stock Measures, Season-
ally Adjusted, Monthly, Billions of Dollars’), available since January 1959, is from the
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and has been converted
to the quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter. Finally, a monthly
seasonally adjusted series for the nominal eective exchange rate computed based
on unit labor costs (series’ code is 111..NEUZF...), available since January 1957, is
from the IMF’s IFS, and it has been converted to the quarterly frequency by taking
averages within the quarter. The overall sample period is from 1959:1 to 2008:1.
A.2 West Germany
Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for the GDP de ator and real GDP are both from
the IMF’s IFS, and are both available since 1960:1 (series’ codes are 13499BIRZF...
and 13499BVRZF... respectively). A monthly seasonally unadjusted series for the
call money rate from the IMF’s IFS, available since January 1957, has been con-
verted to the quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter (series’ code is
13460B..ZF...). A quarterly seasonally adjusted series for M2, available since 1948:4, is
from the Bundesbank. Finally, a monthly seasonally adjusted series for the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate computed based on unit labor costs (acronym is 134..NEUZF...),
available since January 1960, is from the IMF’s IFS, and it has been converted to the
quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter. The overall sample period
is from 1960:1 to 1990:1.
B Details of the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Pro-
cedure
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. The next two subsections describe our
choices for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to sim-
ulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional19
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on the data, while the third section discusses how we check for convergence of the
Markov chain to the ergodic distribution.
B.1 Priors
For the sake of simplicity, the prior distributions for the initial values of the states–
0, 0,a n dk0–which we postulate all to be normal, are assumed to be independent
both from one another, and from the distribution of the hyperparameters. In order
to calibrate the prior distributions for 0, 0 and k0 we estimate a time-invariant
v e r s i o no f( 1 )b a s e do nt h erst 8 years of data, from 1959:3 to 1966:4, and we set
0  Q
h
ˆ ROV>4 · ˆ Y (ˆ ROV)
i
(B1)
As for 0 and k0 we proceed as follows. Let ˆ PROV be the estimated covariance matrix
of w from the time-invariant VAR, and let F be the lower-triangular Choleski factor
of ˆ PROV–i.e., FF0 = ˆ PROV.W es e t
lnk0  Q(ln0>10 × L4) (B2)
where 0 is a vector collecting the logarithms of the squared elements on the diag-
onal of F. We then divide each column of F by the corresponding element on the
diagonal–let’s call the matrix we thus obtain ˜ F–and we set
0  Q[˜ 0> ˜ Y (˜ 0)] (B3)
where ˜ 0–which, for future reference, we dene as ˜ 0  [˜ 0>11, ˜ 0>21, ..., ˜ 0>61]0–is a
vector collecting all the non-zero and non-one elements of ˜ F31 (i.e, the elements below
the diagonal), and its covariance matrix, ˜ Y (˜ 0), is postulated to be diagonal, with
each individual (j,j) element equal to 10 times the absolute value of the corresponding
j-th element of ˜ 0. Such a choice for the covariance matrix of 0 is clearly arbitrary,
but is motivated by our goal to scale the variance of each individual element of 0 in
such a way as to take into account of the element’s magnitude.
Turning to the hyperparameters, we postulate independence between the para-
meters corresponding to the three matrices T, V,a n d]–an assumption we adopt
uniquely for reasons of convenience–and we make the following, standard assump-






with prior degrees of freedom W0 and scale matrix W0 ¯ T. In order to minimize the
impact of the prior, thus maximizing the in u e n c eo fs a m p l ei n f o r m a t i o n ,w es e tW0
equal to the minimum value allowed, the length of w plus one. As for ¯ T, we calibrate
it as ¯ T=  × ˆ PROV, setting =3.5×1034, the same value used by Cogley and Sargent
(2005).20
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The three blocks of V are assumed to follow inverted Wishart distributions, with




















As for ¯ V1, ¯ V2 and ¯ V3, we calibrate them based on ˜ 0 in (B3) as ¯ V1=1033 ×|˜ 0>11|,
¯ V2=1033×diag([|˜ 0>21|>|˜ 0>31|]0) and ¯ V3=1033×diag([|˜ 0>41|>|˜ 0>51|>|˜ 0>61|]0). Such a
calibration is consistent with the one we adopted for T, as it is equivalent to setting
¯ V1, ¯ V2 and ¯ V3 equal to 1034 times the relevant diagonal block of ˜ Y (˜ 0) in (B3).
Finally, as for the variances of the stochastic volatility innovations, we follow Cogley













B.2 Simulating the posterior distribution
We simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states condi-
tional on the data via the following MCMC algorithm, combining elements of Prim-
iceri (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005). In what follows, {w denotes the
entire history of the vector { up to time w–i.e. {w  [{0
1, {0
2,, {0
w]0–while W is the
sample length.
(a) Drawing the elements of w Conditional on \ W, W,a n dKW,t h eo b s e r v a t i o n
equation (1) is linear, with Gaussian innovations and a known covariance matrix.
Following Carter and Kohn (2004), the density s(
















Conditional on W, KW,a n dY , the standard Kalman lter recursions nail down the
rst element on the right hand side of (B9), s(W|\ W> W>KW>Y) = Q(W>S W),w i t h
SW being the precision matrix of W produced by the Kalman lter. The remaining
elements in the factorization can then be computed via the backward recursion algo-
rithm found, e.g., in Kim and Nelson (2000), or Cogley and Sargent (2005, appendix
B.2.1). Given the conditional normality of w,w eh a v e
w|w+1 = w|w + Sw|wS
31
w+1|w (w+1  w) (B10)
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which provides, for each w from W-1 to 1, the remaining elements in (1), s(w|w+1,
\ W, W, KW, Y ) = Q(w|w+1, Sw|w+1). Specically, the backward recursion starts with
a draw from Q(W>S W),c a l li t˜ W Conditional on ˜ W, (B10)-(B11) give us W31|W and
SW31|W, thus allowing us to draw ˜ W31 from Q(W31|W>S W31|W),a n ds oo nu n t i lw=1.
(b) Drawing the elements of w Conditional on \ W, 
W,a n dKW, following Prim-
iceri (2005), we draw the elements of w a sf o l l o w s .E q u a t i o n( 1 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
Dw˜ \w  Dw(\w-[
0
ww)=Dww  xw,w i t hV a r ( xw)=Kw,n a m e l y
˜ \2>w = 21>w˜ \1>w + x2>w (B12)
˜ \3>w = 31>w˜ \1>w  32>w˜ \2>w + x3>w (B13)
˜ \4>w = 41>w˜ \1>w  42>w˜ \2>w  43>w˜ \3>w + x4>w (B14)
–plus the identity ˜ \1>w = x1>w–where [˜ \1>w, ˜ \2>w> ˜ \3>w> ˜ \4>w]0  ˜ \w. Based on the ob-
servation equations (B12)-(B14), and the transition equation (7), the elements of
w can then be drawn by applying the same algorithm we described in the previ-
ous paragraph separately to (B12), (B13) and (B14). The assumption that V has
the block-diagonal structure (9) is in this respect crucial, although, as stressed by
Primiceri (2005, Appendix D), it could in principle be relaxed.
(c) Drawing the elements of Kw Conditional on \ W, 
W,a n dW, the orthogo-
nalised innovations xw  Dw(\w-[
0
ww),w i t hV a r ( xw)=Kw, are observable. Following
Cogley and Sargent (2002), we then sample the kl>w’s by applying the univariate al-
gorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) element by element.26
(d) Drawing the hyperparameters Finally, conditional on \ W, 
W, KW,a n dW,
the innovations to w, w,t h ekl>w’s are observable, which allows us to draw the
hyperparameters–the elements of T, V1, V2 V3,a n dt h e2
l–from their respective
distributions.
Summing up, the MCMC algorithm simulates the posterior distribution of the
states and the hyperparameters, conditional on the data, by iterating on (a)-(d). In
what follows we use a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations to converge to the ergodic
distribution, and after that we run 10,000 more iterations sampling every 10th draw
in order to reduce the autocorrelation across draws.27
B.3 Assessing the convergence of the Markov chain to the
ergodic distribution
Following Primiceri (2005), we assess the convergence of the Markov chain by inspect-
ing the autocorrelation properties of the ergodic distribution’s draws. Specically, in
26For details, see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Appendix B.2.5).
27In this we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005). As stressed by Cogley and Sargent (2005), however,
this has the drawback of ‘increasing the variance of ensemble averages from the simulation’.22
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what follows we consider the draws’ ine!ciency factors (henceforth, IFs), dened as
the inverse of the relative numerical e!ciency measure of Geweke (1992),






where V($) is the spectral density of the sequence of draws from the Gibbs sampler
for the quantity of interest at the frequency $. We estimate the spectral densities by
smoothing the periodograms in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral
window. Following Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), we select the bandwidth parameter
automatically via the procedure introduced by Beltrao and Bloomeld (1987).
Figure 5 and 6 show, for the United States and West Germany, respectively, the
draws’ IFs for the models’ hyperparameters–i.e., the free elements of the matrices T,
],a n dV–and for the states, i.e. the time-varying coe!cients of the VAR (the w),
the volatilities (the kl>w’s), and the non-zero elements of the matrix Dw.A st h egure
clearly shows, the autocorrelation of the draws is uniformly very low, being in the
vast majority of cases around or below 3–as stressed by Primiceri (2005, Appendix
B), values of the IFs below or around twenty are generally regarded as satisfactory.23
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